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Abstract: An econometric examination ofinterest rate differentials reveals
the existence of a significant relationship between the level of exchange
rate policy credibility in Mexico during 1991-1994, and the country’s
macroeconomic performance, the central bank international reserves and
the NAFTA ratification. Interestingly, a steady fali in manufactures output
growth tended to improve credibility, which suggests the existence ofgains
in the government’s disinflationary reputation. Additionally, it is argued
that downward pressure on the dornestic peso-dollar interest differential
came from the exchange rate debt indexation of 1994 and the opening of
the domestic bond market to foreign investment in December 1990.
Resumen: Al analizar la credibilidad de la política cambiaria en México
durante 1991-1994 se obtienen dos resultados básicos: a) que hay una
relación estadísticamente significativa entre el grado de credibilidad y el
desempeño macroeconómico del país, las reservas internacionales del
banco central y la ratificación del TLC; y b) que la indexación cambiaria de
la deuda interna durante 1994 presionó a la baja al diferencial de tasas
de interés entre cetes y tesobonos, independientemente del compor
tamiento de las expectativas cambiarias. Se argumenta que la apertura del
mercado de bonos a la inversión extranjera en diciembre de 1990 habría
generado un efecto similar.
ccording to sorne interpretations, the speculative attack that pre
eded the currency crisis of December 1994 in Mexico, was ulti
mately the result ofa process ofcumulative real currency appreciation,
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rising trade deficits and declining output growth, which preannounced
an eventual policy revision (see e.g. Dornbusch et al., 1995). Yet, when
dealing with expectations, it is analytically possible to think of two
opposite effects frorn a government sustaining an exchange rate peg
under conditions of relatively high domestic inflation: on one side, it
may be that, as inthe reasoning aboye, the negativeoutput and balance
of payrnents figures lead market participants to expect an offsetting
devaluation, an insight critical to the rnost recent generation of cur
rency crisis modeis (see e.g. Drazen and Masson 1993). The potentially
irnportant role ofreputation, though, opens a second possibility: by as
surning the output cost of the real appreciation, a government rnay
eventually be able to convince market participants ofits true intention
to maintain the announced exchange rate policy (for a discussion, see
Persson 1988); indeed, for a new administration engineering a reces
sion may be a way to identify itself as “tough” (see Blackburn and
Christensen 1989, section IV).
Policy decisions respond to this trade-off, and thus they can be
altered by different types of shocks, notably those affecting macro
econornic performance (an exogenous fail in exports rnay turn the
balance in favor of devaluation) or governrnent preferences (a succes
sion may bring less anti-inflationary authorities to office). Following
this perspective, it has been argued that the timing of the peso
devaluation and the currency attack that carne before it were condi
tioned by the change ofadministration oflate 1994 (see Ibarra 1998a).
The important point is that, certainly within limits, expectations may
improve in the face of adverse macroeconomic results induced by a
process of currency appreciation, precisely because of a gain in repu
tation. This channel seems relevant for understanding the recent
Mexican case, which featured a significant improveñent in policy
credibility between late 1992 and early 1994, under conditions of a
steady decline in output growth.
A second basic question concerns the behavior of expectations
during 1994, when the country experienced severe political shocks in
the forrn ofsocial and political violence, the celebration ofpresidential
elections and finally the administration change of December. The
observed evolution of expectations raises a puzzle: whereas interest
rate differentials jumped immediately after the assassination ofcan
didate Colosio in March, they stabilized quite rapidly afterwards and
in fact showed sorne irnprovement as the year drew to a close (before
the devaluation). As a first approximation, the observation could be
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attributed to the political certainty brought about by the rulingparty’s
electoral victory; yet, oné suspects this cannot be the whole story in a country like Mexico, where presidential transitions tend to be turbu
lent periods.
An alternative explanation comes from the area of public debt
management, and in particular from the steady rise in the share of
dollar-indexed tesobonos in private portfolios after March 1994 (a supply shock). As is well known, the indexation has a positive signal
ing effect on expectations (by linking the debt’s peso value to the
exchange rate, it raises the fiscal cost ofa devaluation); a second effect
can also be irnportant, however: by shifting the position of the mar
ginal investor, the recomposition may result in a reduction in interest
rate differentjals independent ofthe overali behavior ofexpectations.
This raises the possibility that the record of stable expectations in
Mexico as 1994 drew to a close mayhave been to sorne extent spurious.
As it turns out, a similar perspective is useful to show that the open
ing of the domestic bond market to foreign investment in December
1990 (a demand shock) tended as well to cornpress interest rate
differentjals.
Thus the purpose of this paper is to measure and explain the
behavior of exchange rate expectations in Mexico during 1991-1994,
tryingto make sense inparticularofthe relativelyhigh degree ofpolicy
credibility registered most ofthe time. The contents is as follows. The
next section examines the behavior ofan adjusted peso-dollar interest
rate differential, as an mdicator ofthe degree ofexchange rate policy
credibility. This is followed by a presentation in section 2 of sorne
econometrjc evidence regarding credibility factors in our period. Sec
tion 3 then focuses on the effects of the supply and demand shocks
mentioned aboye, with the help ofa small analytical framework based
on the postulate ofdispersed market expectations: first we discuss the
impact of the domestie debt indexation and update the econometric
output from section 2; to gain further insight, we look at the compara
tive behavior ofexpectations in the bond and the exchange rate hedge
markets. Second, in a more speculative mood, we analyze the transi
tional dynamics ofthe domestic interestrate and overail bond holdings
after a country opens its domestic bond market to foreign investment.
Thepattern replicates some aspects ofthe Mexican episode, but formal
econometrjc testing is left to future work.
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1. Exchange Rate Policy Credibility in Mexico, 1991-1994
During our period, exchange rate policy in Mexico took the form of a
sliding peso band against the U.S. dollar, with the band’s floor fixed
from November 1991 onward and the ceiling’s crawl rate periodicaily
revised within the formal renewals ofthe incomes policy agreements
known as pacts. The daily crawl was 0.04 peso cents through 10
November 1991, 0.02 cents until 19 October 1992, and again 0.04 cents
until the December 1994 devaluation. As is weli known, under condi
tions ofunregulated portfolio selection and perfect asset substitutabil
ity, depreciation expectations can be obtained from a domestic peso
doilar interest rate differential. However, given that we are interested
in measuring policy credibility, instead of depreciation expectations
per se, we have to adjust the differential for the peso depreciation
within the band. Thus our procedure invoives the foilowing steps (see
Svensson 1991): first, we estimate the expected peso depreciation from
the arbitrage condition that the expected return on peso-denominated
treasury bilis (cetes) and dollar-indexed tesobonos be equal, i.e.,
= (S÷. / S)
— 1 = {(1+i ) / (1+j*)}m
— 1,
where is the expected i-day depreciation rate on t, S the spot
exchange rate (peso price of the dollar), + the i-terrn expected ex
change rate,i and i the annualized i-day tesobono and cete interest
rates, respectiveiy, aixd m W365. Next, using the official crawl rate, we
compute the maximum depreciation rate compatible with the band,
deflned as the difference between the announced ceiiing andthe current
exchange rate,
= (S—, + cqi)/S — 1,
where d— is the maximum i-day depreciationrate to be allowed within
the band as oft, S— is the current band ceiling, and a is the daily crawi
rate (in pesos). Finally, to measure the degree of policy credibility, we
subtract the maximum depreciation compatible with the band from the
expected depreciation,
= _d—;
in this way, a positive value (which we cali excess expected depre
ciation) is indicative of a less than fully credibie exchange rate band.
In the estimation of(1) we use the shortest interest rates avail able (28-day rates throiigh mid 1992, and 91-day rates thereon) in order to minimize any possible distortions arising from expectations ofcapital gains. Figure 1 presents the weekly series ford 365 andd— 365 . From the figure it is clear that strong changes in expectations took place over time. We may note, in particular, the rapid increase in the annual expected depreciation during most of 1992 (with expectations reaching a 14% peak by the end ofthe year), the subsequent fali down to 4% in early 1994, and finally the discrete increase in the interest differential that followed the assassination of Colosio in March 1994. Note as well the steady rise in the maximum depreciation rate, up to a 12.5% peak before the political shock. This gradual improvement in the band’s strength carne from two sources: a) the higher crawl rate introduced in October 1992, and b) the stabilization of the exchange rate, which resulted in an increasing gap between the actual rate and the band ceiling (see Figure 2). This latter factor can be explained, at least for the period before the November 1993 ratification Of NAFrA, by the existence of a narrow band within which the Banco de México intervened on a daily basis (see Schwartz 1994).
Figure 3 presents the weekly series forx 365 whose behavior reflects the joint effect ofvariations in the expected depreciation rate and in the position ofthe exchange rate within the band. We may note:
a) The steady erosion in credibility during most of 1992 (with peaking at 10% in October), followed by a sustained improvement between late 1992 and early 1994, with fuil credibility(x 365 < 0) already evident by mid 1993. Taking into consideration the information in Figures 1 and 2, we see that full policy credibility in Mexico was the combined outcome of: i) a steady fail in the expected depreciation rate, ji) the October 1992 rise in the band’s crawl rate, and iii) the stabili zation ofthe actual exchange rate, which resulted in the rate shifting toward the strong (lower) halfofthe band.
















































































































Starting in the late 1980s, the Mexican government’s exchange rate policy assurned a predorninantlydisinflationary role, withthe nominal rate consistently lagging behind the pace of domestic price rises. The stabilization program was clearly successful, with the annual inflation rate (12-month cii variation) falling frorn 180% in February 1988 to 7% in November 1994. The macroeconomic cost of disinflation was evident as well: between 1989 and 1994, Mexican wholesale dollar prices increased about 30% against their U.S. counterparts; there was a steady decline in growth, in terms of both GDP (from more than 4% in 1990 to less than 1% in 1993) and manufactures output (with annual growth rates below minus 5% by late 1993); and rneanwhile the trade deficit shifted from $1.8 billion in the first quarter of 1991 to $4.3 billion three years later (for sorne ofthe variables, see Figure 4a). In this section we examine the effect ofthese and other variables on the
level ofexchange rate policy credibility in the country. As argued in the introduction, the effect of declining output growth on policy credibility is ambiguous a priori: on one side, fali inggrowth resulting frorn the adoption of a:disinflationary stance may create in the private sector the image of a “tough” administration, willingto stickwith the announced policy; on the other, the cumulative cost in terrns of growth deceleration together with the high trade deficits may eventually lead to a policy revision; within lirnits, any of the two effects may prevail. The impact fromvariations inthe inflation rate is also uncertain: on one side, as dornestic inflation approaches the international rate, there is a natural reduction in the scope for further disinflation, which could prompt a relaxation in exchange rate policy; on the other, the government rnay be unwilling to lose the disinflationary reputation it has accumulated over time. Moreover, as inflation falis, presumably the expected size of devaluation also de clines. Thus it is an empirical question which of the possible effects predominates.
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shock and to $10 billion before the devaluation. The position of the exchange rate within the Tand may as well be ofimportance, although the direction ofthe effect is again unclear onpurely analyticalgrounds: with constant target zone credibility, a shift toward the band’s upper limit wilI create expectations of future appreciation to central parity (see Svensson 1996 for a recent discussion, and Werner 1996 for the Mexican case); but the same shift could be interpreted as a sign of mounting pressure on the band and hence of a higher likelihood ofrealignment (it is mainly for this uncertain effect that we prefer not to use the so-called drift adjustment method; for atechnical discussion, see Ibarra 1998b).
As we already showed, in Mexico there were three main stages in the evolution of the exchange rate within the band: during 1991, it remained close to central parity, without any sigriificant fluctuation; in 1992 and 1993, it showed a narrow oscillatorypattern, stayingmost of the time in the strong half of the band; and finally, by the end of February 1994 it started to depreciate very rapidly, and in a matter of days it was practically hitting the band ceiling (see Figures 2 and 4b).
Finally, we need to make allowance for the possible influence of at least three different shocks. The first consists of variations in the crawl rate, whose direct effect on our measure ofcredibilityis straight forward: for any given expected depreciation, a rise in the crawl rate increases the future value ofthe band ceiling, and hence reduces the excess expected depreciation. But there is a second, indirect effect: by altering the implicit path ofthe exchange rate’s upper limit, changes in the crawl rate determine to sorne extent whether or not a major parity adjustment will take place in the future. For instance, the crawl rise of October 1992 was followed by a fail in the expected depreciation rate.
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1 td is adjusted for the level ofeconomic activity, by dividing the actual trade deficit by an
index of manufactures output (set equal to 1 in January 1991), in order to reduce the possible
collinearity between the trade deficit and output growth; the results remain basically the same
ifthe raw trade figures are used instead. rer is computed as (St12.4615)(P*IP)t, where 2.4615 is
the average 1989 spot exchange rate and P and P are the US and Mexican wholesale pnce
indexes (1989 1), respectively. 1989 is a good reference year since: a) there was a small trade
deficit ($0.6 billion) in a context of relatively high domestic output growth (3.3% per year), b)
the bulk of the trade liberalization program had already taken place (mainly in 1985), and
e) the manufactures share in exports had doubled from jts 25% 1980 leve 1 . 2 Note this is not a restriction needing testing, but a simple equation transformation
intended to achieve higher efficiency in the estimation (see Hendry 1995).
L’v66t
Thus our credibility equation for regression analysis is,








where td is the monthly trade deficit (in billions ofdollars), rer a real
exchange rate index, mg the manufactures output growth rate (12-
month percentage variation in output), p the inflation rate (12-month
cpi percentage variation), swb the percentage deviation of the ex
change rate from its central parity (a positive value indicates the
currency is in the bartd’s weak halO, and fr the central bank’s stock of
foreign reserves (in $10 billion; see Figures 4a, b).’ The last three
variables in equation (4) are representative ofshocks: nafta starts at zero
and takes a value of 1 from the November 1993 ratification onward; pact
equals 1 in the months of high crawl rate (0.0004 pesos) and zero
elsewhere; and finally pi, intended to capture the effect of political
uncertainty in 1994, takes a value of 1 from March (Colosio’s assassina
tion) to July (the last month before the presidential elections).
In the estimation we use monthly observations and work with
current and lagged (up to two months) values for the explanatory
variables. The aim is not only to capture the protracted effect of
information on expectations, but also to make allowance for any lags
in the release of statistical data to the public. In order to avoid
problems of collinearity between current and past values of each
variable, though, we make the following transformation: instead of
entering each variable x throughout in leveis (i.e.,a 1 x +a 2 x 1 +a 3 x 2 ),
we include the current level plus differences with respect to the last
two periods:b 1 x +b 2 dx+b 3 d2x, where dx = x —x 1 and d2x =
x
— It is easy to show that the following correspondence exactly
holds for the parameters: b 1 = a 1 + a 2 +a 3 , b 2 = —a 2 , and b 3 = —a 3 . 2Thus
b 1 represents the protracted effect of a change in the explanatory
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estimate equation (4) by instrumental variables (IV) to correct for the
possible endogeneity ofreserves (variations in credibility are likely to
have a significant effect on international capital flows and hence on
the central bank’s reserve position); as instruments we use the current
and once lagged values of the 3-month U.S. treasury bill rate (tbill),
with the transformation to differences explained aboye. 3
Each equation is accompanied by a diagnostics battery: we test
for (the absence of) second degree autoregressive and second degree
ARCH errors, and for normality in distribution. There is also an F reset
test for functional specification (it tests whether squared fitted values of
the explained variable appear as a significant explanatory variable in a
separate regression), and in the case of TV estimation, we present a x 2
test for the validity ofinstruments. * (**) following a statistic means that
the nuil hypothesis is rejected at 5% (1%) significance level, and thus
that the modeli not cornpletely satisfactory (that is, errors are not well
behaved, etc. See Hendry 1995 for a discussion of the tests; ah results
were obtained using the econometrics program PcGive).
Columns B and C in Table 1 present the OLS estimation output
for the sample period 1991(3)-1994(11). The main results are as
follows: the excess expected depreciation rate depends positively on
the trade deficit and the manufactures growth rate, and negatively
on the reserves stock; as it turns out, the level of credibility is posi
tively affected by the inulation rate and the position of the exchange
rate within the band (the latter, a mean reversion effect), and nega
tively by the real exchange rate (a bandwagon effect). In ah cases, the
protracted effect is statistically significant (column C). Also, the influ
ence of each variable is consistent over time, in the sense that the
coefficient size does not show dramatic variations between current and
lagged values, whereas the coefficient sign does not change (in both
respects, the exceptions are the once lagged trade deficit and twice
lagged reserves). As to the rest of variables, the equation reveals a
strong positive effect on credibility from the NAFTA ratification, but it
fails to detect any significant effect from variations in the crawl rate
and the emergence of political instability. Overail, the diagnostic set
is satisfactory, although the model barely fails to reject the nuli
hypothesis of no autoregressive errors.
TV estimation (column D) shows good diagnostics (including the
It would be desirable to make allowance for the possible endogeneity ofswb as welI, but
we lack plausible instruments.
test for the validity ofinstruments), and in particular there is a clear
improvement in the test’for autoregressive errors. Moreover, the
direction of effects corresponds to that detected in column B, but in
addition there is a general rise in the size of the coefficients, in sorne
cases doubling the original value; on the other side, pact and pi remain
statistically irrelevant.
As is well known, a potential source of difficulty in the interpre
tation ofresults in time series regression analysis is the possibihity of
nonstationarity in the variables; to address this issue, we perform
Dickey-Fuller tests for the existence of unit roots in our model. The
results are generally good: for td, rer and mg, the unit root nuil
hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level; for p the nuil is
rejected at 5%, while for excess expected depreciation, fr and tbill it
is rejected at 10% (see Table 4; critical values for the test with a
constant were obtained from Charemza and Deadman, 1992).
The unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected for swb, though. 4 It is
of interest then to review our regression results after this variable is
removed. OLS estimation ofequation (4), with a zero restriction on the
swb coefficient, is shown in Table 1, columns E’ and C’. Note that there
is an evident erosion in the goodness offit ofthe model: each variable
shows statistically insignificant coefficients (except for nafta, and now
pi), there is an important increase in the residual sum ofsquares and
a fali in the Durbin-Watson statistic, and now there is evidence of
second degree autoregressive errors. This erosion advises against
removing swb from the model. But in any case, it should be noted that
in most cases the coefficient signs carry over from column B: in
particular, the effect oftd, mg and pi on the excess expected deprecia
tion remains positive, while that of p, fr and nafta is stihl negative.
In summary, the results so far suggestthat the credibility erosion
frorn mid 1991 to late 1992 was primarily an outcome ofthe rapid rise
in the country’s trade deficit, whereas the dramatic recovery during
1993 and early 1994 came from the steady rise in reserves, the
stabilization of the trade deficit, and the manufactures’ slowdown,
which more than offset the effect of the economy’s gradual approach
to international inflation rates. The influence of these factors was
dramaticahly reinforced by the iatification OfNAFTA. The credibility loss
This result probably reflects the change in the central bank’s intervention rules occurred
in November 1993, when the ceiling of the intervention band was brought to coincide with the
official band’s (thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion), and of course the discrete

























































































































































































































































































of 1994 was the result of a renewed rise in the trade deficit, higher
dynamism in the manufactures and a loss of reserves. A somewhat
counterintuitive result is that, when these effects are discounted,
there is no evidence of a significant impact from political uncertainty
(except in Table 1, columns B’ and C’).
The evidence of a negative effect ofoutput growth on the level of
policy credibility deserves particular attention. The finding could be
attributed to the impact ofcurrent output growth on the future trade
deficit, but the empirical evidence advises against this interpretation.
First, because arguably the most important effect of growth on the
trade balance is contemporaneous, and that effect is already captured
by the td coefficient; second, because of the positive rer coefficient,
when in fact a real currency appreciation is surely a sign of a future
trade deficit rise; but most importantly, because the lagged mg coeffi
cients are consistently (includingthe results in the next section) positive,
even though the lagged effect of output growth on expectations via the
current trade deficit is already captured by the td coefficient.
An alternative interpretation is that the positive effect ofgrowth
deceleration on exchange rate policy credibility carne mainly from
gains in reputation: in particular, the government’s adherence to the
disinflationary program in the face ofeconomic deceleration may have
been interpreted by market participants as evidence ofthe authorities’
true intention to stick with the announced exchange rate policy. This
interpretation, which postulates that there exists a connection be
tween disinflationary intentions and exchange rate credibility, is
supported by the statistically significant inflation coefficient: as do
mestic inflation and hence the scope for further disinflation feli, policy
credibility tended to decline; in other words, agents did believe that
the government was resorting to its exchange rate policy to reduce the
domestic inflation rate. 5
3. Dispersed Expectatioris and Debt Shocks
So far we have assumed, following conventional practice, that changes in the interest rate differential reflect exclusively variations in the state ofmarket expectations. Consider, however, that under the plau sible assumption that expectations differ among market participants, the differential (i.e., the excess return demanded to hold an asset) will reflect the expectations of the investor in the margin (for an early exposition, see Kahn 1954; for a recent discussion, Hartley 1996),6with the implication that the differential may change, irrespective of the overail behavior ofexpectations, by exogenous shifts in the position of the marginal investor. It may be possible to abstract from this factor in sorne cases, but not in that ofMexico during our period, when there were two major debt shocks, namely the dollar indexation ofdomestic debt in 1994 (a protracted supply shock) and the opening of the domestic bond market to foreign investment in December 1990 (a demand shock).
In this section we consider first the supply shock: a direct conclu sion from a simple model is that the peso-dollar interest differential in Mexico tended to fail after March 1994 due to the rise in tesobono holdings in the private sector, irrespective ofthe evolution ofexpecta tions; we present sorne empirical evidence supporting this prediction. In the second part we take on the demand shock and analyze the behavior of the interest differentjal when the domestic bond market opens to foreign investrnent, assuming again expectations as given; although in this case the analysis is purely speculative, in that no formal statistical testing is presented, the basic results seern to repro duce important aspects ofthe Mexican experience in terms ofinterest rates and asset holdings.
The results concerning fr deserve a further comment. It has been frequently noted that,
before the peso crisis, the Banco de México failed to announce with opportunity the level of the
stock offoreign reserves. The presumption, ofcourse, is that the central bank was tryingto avoid
further speculative pressure on the parity as reserves started falling. In this paper, however (as
in several others that deal with the experience of different countries; for an infiuential study,
see Rose and Svensson, 1994), we show that the international reserves come out with a positive,
in most of the cases significant, effect on the level ofpolicy credibility. A possible explanation is
that the central bank purposefully began to retain relevant information only toward the end of
1994. Alternatively, given the fact that the central bank did not completely sterilize capital
inflows in the period, the fali in the cete rate may reflect the resulting money supply shock. In
fact, the analysis in section 3.2 below is based on the idea that a capital inflows shock tends to
reduce the peso interest rate independently ofthe behavior of expectations.
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3.1. Currency Debt Recomposition
Let us start by positing that there is disagreement among market participants regarding the level ofthe nominal exchange rate likely to prevail at the end of a given investment period, and construct a
6 While mostly extraneous to recent macroeconomics, the assumption ofdispersed expec tations is central to the literature on the microstructure of foreign exchange markets; see, for instance, the introduction in Frankel st al. (1996).
247
Exchange Rate Policy Credibility in Mexico, 1991-1994
1 t .4Carlos Alberto Ibarra
cumulative distribution of the total domestic wealth commanded by
those market participants (which defines the aggregate portfolio size),
ordered by the expected exchange rate (closest to the origin will be the
investor expecting the lowest rate). Following Steindl (1990), we may
allow any single market participant to entertain a variety of expecta
tions, assuming individual wealth is distributed according to the relative
strength with which each different expectation is heid. Then, for any
value ofthe exchange rate (S), the corresponding point in the cumulative
distribution will show the amount offinancial resources in the portfolios
ofmarket participants expecting a rate equal to or lower than S.
We assume there are only two types of short-dated financial
assets: foreign bonds, denominated in dollars, and domestic, peso-de
nominated bonds (to keep the analysis simple, we assume there are
no cash holdings). Given the interest rates at home and abroad, the
desired portfolio composition will be a function of the expected cur
rency depreciation; for example, if the differential between domestic
and foreign rates is then the amount of wealth heid in domes-
tic bonds will represent those investments made under the expecta
tion of a currency depreciation no greater than d; the remaining
wealth will of course be invested in foreign bonds.
The relationship between depreciation expectations and interest
rate differentials as the basis for portfolio selection makes it possible
to derive a cumulative distribution oftotal wealth ordered by the level
of the domestic interest rate (since we are dealing with a srnall
economy, we take the international interest rate, i’°, as given); closest
to the origin vil1 be the investorexpectingthe lowest depreciation rate.
For any interest rate leve!, the corresponding point in the cumulative
distribution will show the arnount of resources invested under the
assumption ofa currency depreciation no greater thani-i Thus there
is a connection, governed by the distribution of exchange rate expec
tations, between the interest rate prevailing in each period and the
amount of peso-denominated bonds issued by the authorities; in par
ticular, the stock of bonds determines the interest rate that has to
obtain in the market, reflecting the state of expectations behind the
marginal investment. This is shown in Figure 5, where the quantity
of bonds is B, the resulting interest ratei 0 , and the amount ofdollar
denominated bonds W-B.
‘ Note that we are simplifying the parity condition from which equation 1) is derived to
Within this framework, the effect of a recomposition of domestic debt toward dollar-indexed tesobonos is irnmediately seen. A reduction in the share ofpeso assets will result in a fail in the peso interest rate, even assuming unchanged expectations, because those investors with the highest expected depreciation rates will shift to dollar assets. The potential significance of this factor in the case of Mexico is easilv il!ustrated: in the course of 1994, the end ofperiod share oftesobonos in tota! domestic debt rose steadily from 5% in lVlarch to 40% in November (including central bank holdings; source: Mexican Treasury).
Empirically ve examine the issue in two ways: first, we estimate again equation (4), after adding as a new explanatory variable the share of dollar-indexed bonds in total domestic debt, ids. Table 2 presents the results. Column B shows that the protracted effect of a rise in indexed debt has the expected negative sign: an increase in the share oftesobonos is associated with a statistica!ly significant decline in the excess expected depreciation. In particular, the ids coefficient indicates that a 10 point risc in the share ofdol!ar-jndexed debt (a 0.1 rise in ids) tended to produce a 7 point gain in our indicator of policy credibility.
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Note that introducing the new variable has sorne effects on the
other variable’s coefficients: in particular, those corresponding to td,
rer and swb lose statistical significance, while that of pi becomes
negative; on the other side, although the absolute size ofthe mg, p, fr
and nafta coefficients falls, the signs carry over from Table 1 and
remain statistically significant. In other words, the influence from
macroeconomic fundamentais remains significant (except for td) and
the evidence of gains in reputation survives. When we estimate the
equation by IV (column D), the sarne conclusions concerning funda
mentais apply, but the ids coefficient changes to positive and becomes
statistically irrelevant.
Thus the results shown in Table 2 lend sorne mixed support to
the idea that the dollarization of dornestic debt of 1994 tended to low
er the value ofour indicator of(excess) expected depreciation. A second
source ofevidence comes from data generated in the foreign-exchange
hedge market, created by the Banco de México in the aftermath ofthe
1982 debt crisis (Manseil 1992). The reason for looking at these data,
in particular the depreciation rates implicit in the hedge contracts, is
straightforward: the introduction of tesobonos had a direct effect on
the position of the marginal investor in the bond market, but only an
indirect one in the hedge market (for example, greater tesobono
holdings may have reduced the forward demand for dollars, pulling
down the future price of dollar and probably the spot rate as well).
Hence ve can expect to find a divergence ofexpectations, measured in
the margin, between participants in these two markets, as the share
of tesobonos rose.
Figure 6 presents the weekly series foi’ the annualized expected
depreciation rate from 90-day hedge contracts from mid 1993 to the
end of 1994 (before the devaluation). The broad pattern is similar to
that of the bond rnarket, consisting basically of a downward trend
during 1993 and early 1994, a discrete upward shift in late March, and
then a stabilization and eventual improvernent as the year drew to a
close. But note the series corresponding to the difference between
expected depreciation rates in these two rnarkets: from mid 1993 until
the end ofthe first quarter of 1994, the difference in expectations was















































Thc’ fbllowing results are particularly important, given that the regression results in
Table 2 hayo the drawback that wc are not able to reject the nuli hvpothesis of unit root for ids,
even at a 1O’ significance level (see Table 4).
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the year, however, there appears to be a distinctive rise, particularly
in the weeks imrnediately following the March shock, and then again
during the final weeks ofthe year. Casual empiricism at least suggests
that the rise is significant: taking quarterly averages, the difference
shifted from 1.09 to 3.23, 2.15 and 2.54 points in the course ofthe year.
To examine more formally these data, we estimate a regression
equation ofthe hedge market’s expected depreciation rate on the bond
market’s counterpart and a dummy starting at zero and taking a value
of 1 from the last week ofMarch onward (when the debt recomposition
started). The results in Table 3, based on weekly observations for the
period 1993(23) to 1994(49), show as expected a statistically signifi
cant, positive dummy coefficient: duríng the period ofindexation, the
expected depreciation rate in the hedge market rose in relation to that
in the bond market. Since the result is not entirely satisfactory in that
there is evidence of autocorrelated errors and misspeciflcation, we
re-estimate the equation using as additional independent variables
the hedge market’s lagged expected depreciation rate and the first
difference of the bond market’s expected depreciation rate. With this
modification, the error autocorrelation is eliminated, while the posi
tive, statistically significant dummy coefficient persists.
Finally, to gain further insight, we perform unit root tests on the
regression residuas as a simple way of determining whether there is
a basis for suspecting cointegration between expectations in both
markets (see Charemza and Deadman, 1992). Ideally we would like to
see signs of cointegration appear only after the dummy for debt
recomposition has been introduced. First, we verify that the nuli
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected, at a 5% significance level, for
expectations in both the hedge and bond markets (see Table 4); thus
in practice we can disregard the risk of spurious regressióh results in
Table 3. Next we perforrn Dickey-Fuller tests on (a) the difference
in expectations between the two rnarkets, (b) the residuals from a
regression ofhedge market expectations on bond market expectations
alone, (c) the residuals from the first regression in Table 3, and (d) the
residuals frorn the second regression in Table 3.
The test results are as follows: the unit root nuli hypothesis
cannot be rejected for case (a), even at a 10% significance level,
whereas for cases (b) to (d), rejection occurs at a 1% level (using again
the critical values supplied by Charemza and Deadman, 1992). Thus
there is evidence suggesting the existence of cointegration, starting
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postulated effect of the introduction of tesobonos, consider that there is indeed an important rfse in the t-values when we introduce the dummy for debt recomposition: in particular, they rise in absolute value from 3.131 in case (b), up to 4.638 and 8.351 in cases (e) and (d) (see Table 4).
In brief, there is evidence that the peso-dollar interest rate
differential in the domestic bond rnarket tended to decline as the share
of tesobonos rose, after taking into account the effect of other macro
econornic variables on expectations. This effect would help to explain
why, despite the political uncertainty of 1994, the interest differential
eventually returned to relatively Iow leveis before the devaluation.
This negative relationship could in principie be attributed to the
signaling effect of the government’s decision to index, and not to a
change in the marginal investor’s position in the bond rnarket: the logic
would be that, by linking the peso value of debt to the nominal
exchange rate and thus raising the fiscal cost of a devaluation, the
authorities showed their genuine commitment to a no-devaluation
policy (see Dornbusch 1996 for a recent discussion). This represents a
powerful incentive and thus it is probably one factor behind the
regression results in Table 2. Yet this signaling effect cannot account
for the whole story, in particular the hedge-bond market divergence,
given that there is no reason to assume that participants in the hedge
market were less receptive to the government’s signais than those in
the bond market, at least with regard to such major decisions as the
currency composition of public debt.
It could also be argued that, since foreign investors were not
allowed to trade in the hedge market, the observed hedge-bond market
divergence reflected a sudden differentiation ofexpectations between
domestic and foreign residents. But this explanation implies an im
plausible segmentation of expectations: it would have to be assumed
that foreigners were in the margin in the bond market throughout the
entire period (so that the interest rate differentiai reflected in every
moment their expectations), a sign that they were more pessirnistic
than domestic investors in that market, and yet that they suddenly
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Frankcl and Schrnukler 1996) present evidence from three Mexican closed-end country funds, indicativo of a divergence in expectations between forcign and domestcc investors, with the Iatter turning suddenly more pessimistic at the onset of crisis. Their results, based on the behavior offund discounts, show, however, that such divergence appeared only at about the tune ofdevaluation; in fact. the evolution ofdiscounts in two ofthe funds reveals that during most of
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It seems safe then to conclude that the relatively good behavior
of the cete-tesobono interest rate differential in the final months of
1994 should be partly attributed to a change in the position ofthe mar
ginal investor in the cete market, resulting from the exchange rate
indexation of domestic debt; in this way, the cete rate would have
tended to decline because those investors expecting the highest depre
ciation rates were shifting to domestic dollar assets)°
To conclude this section, we formally analyze the dynamics ofinterest
rate and asset holdings after a small country’s bond rnarket opens to
foreign investment, focusing in particular on the transition period of
portfolio adjustment. We do this to reflect upon the likely effects ofthe
opening that took place in Mexico in December 1990, although as we
mentioned before the approach is highly speculative in that we post-
pone for future work the revision of econometric evidence.
Thus for our present purposes, we start by noting that it is
possible to draw a cumulative distribution of the wealth of market
participants according to their exchange rate expectations, similar to
that in Figure 5, but for the rest of the world (not shown). At the
interest rate differentiali 0 —i’, desired holdings of domestic bonds are
equal to B*, but since foreigners are not allowed to participate in the
domestic market, B’ also corresponds to the initial gap between actual
(zero) and desired holdings. Assume next that the legal barriers to
foreign investment are removed. There will be then a gradual reduc
tion in the gap between actual and desired stocks, which will yield a
capital inflow as long as the portfolio adjustment is under way; but
since the quantity ofdomestic bonds in the private sector is fixed, there
has to be a transference ofbonds frorn domestic residents to foreigners,
which to happen requires a reduction in the domestic interest rate.
1994 foroign investors were more pessimistic than their dornestic counterparts. In any event, it
should be noted that the existence of discounts reflects disparities in profit (not exchange-rate)
expectations; this two types ofexpectations may even be inversely related, if, as seems plausible
to assume for an international fund, the constituting firms are located mainly in the tradable
goods sector and their profitability is affected positively by a devaluation.
‘° This effect is reinforced ifwe assume thatu) investors are risk-averse, and b) those with
the greatest degree of aversion shifted from cetes to tesobonos. This would have reduced the
cete-tesobono interest differential ifone assumes there is a statistically significant currency-risk
premium (thanks to an anonymous referee for this comment).
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The transference will produce a capital outflow exactly matching the
inflow (abstracting for the moment from wealth effects; see below).
Naturally, as i declines, the foreigners’ desired stock also falis,
which contributes to eliminating the gap between actual and desired
portfolio shares. The cumulative fall in the domestic interest rate
eventually needed to re-establish world portfolio equilibrium (in the
absence of wealth changes) can be obtained by adding the rest of the
world to the domestic cumulative distribution; in Figure 5, this results
in the new interest ratei 1 . At this rate, home holdings of domestic
bonds have declined to B 1 and those offoreign bonds increased to W—B 1 ;
naturally, foreigners hoid the remaining B—B 1 domestic bonds.
The interest rate adjustment will be gradual if, as seems plausible
to assume, the shift from foreign to domestic securities takes time; this
would reflect the varying speeds at which different foreign investors
acquire the necessary information to enter the domestic market, the
rnaturity structure of portfolios, etc. We can represent this process by
the following equation,
dildt = fg — cx)W’, f < 0, g’(i) > O
where W is foreign wealth, and g and a stand for the desired and
actual shares of domestic bonds in foreign portfolios. This equation
defines a horizontal i une in i,W’ space, along which the domestic
interest rate is constant. Aboye the une there is excess demand for
dornestic securities and the interest rate falis; its position depends on
a: as a rises during portfolio adjustment, the une moves upward.
We consider now wealth dynamics. We take world wealth (Q) as
given, so that domestic wealth is simply 2_W*, and changes in
domestic and foreign wealth cancel each other out. Variations in pri
vate wealth arise from discrepancies between income and expenditure
in the private sector; under fiscal equilibrium, any excess expendi
ture will appear as a deficit in the current account of the balance of
payments. The change in foreign wealth will thus be equal to the home
current account deficit, Q:
dW*/dt
= Q = T — i’F + iB* T
— i’’m(Q — W’) + iaW’,
3.2. Financial Liberalization and Capital In,flows
(5)
T,, T., m’(i) < O (6)
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where T is the home trade deficit (a negative function offoreign wealth
and the interest rate because ofexpenditure effects), F denotes domes-
tic holdings of foreign bonds, and m is the share of foreign securities
in domestic portfolios (for sirnplicity, throughout the analysis we
retain the assumption of no cash holdings and keep the nominal
exchange rate fixed at 1).
After imposing the Q = O condition, equation (6) defines a w une
of stationary wealth. Interest rate and wealth variations have both
portfolio and expenditure effects which make it difficult to establish
on purely analytical grounds the line’s siope. An interest rate rise, on
the expenditure side, iinproves the trade balance, which could be offset
by a dornestic wealth rise; on the portfolio side, it raises the interest
payments on foreign holdings of home securities and reduces desired
home holdings of foreign securities, both increasing the current ac
count deficit this could be offset by a fali in foreign wealth. It seems
in accord with econornic experience that a rise in the domestic interest
rate will reduce the current account deficit because of a relatively
strong expenditure effect on trade. In such case, the w schedule’s siope
and the system’s dynamic characteristics wilI depend on the strength
ofthe wealth effect on expenditure.
With a relatively weak effect, correcting an interest rate rise’s
effect on the current account will require a rise in foreign wealth so as
to increase the non trade part of the current account deficit. In i,W*
space, the w une will be upward sloping and there will be a positive
current account deficit to its right, where foreign wealth will hence be
rising. With a strong wealth effect, on the contrary, the une will
be downward sloping, with falling foreign wealth to its right. In the
first case, an initial current account deficit vil1 rise over time, whereas
in the latter it will converge toward zero. Since the risingdficit better
conforrns to the characteristics of our period, we will focus on the
former case, but it should be noted that a similar analysis could be
carried out with a downward sloping w une, gradually shifting to
the right because of a real currency appreciation.
The position ofthe w une changes with c. Again, assuming a weak
expenditure effect of wealth variations and a strong effect from
changes in the interest rate, the une will shift upwards as alpha rises:
the increasing non trade deficit will be offset by sorne combination of
higher i and lower W* values.
Figure 7 presents the i and w unes in i,W* space. It can be shown
that, starting with a balanced current account, after the opening of
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the domestic bond market the economy will move to the region of
fallinginterest rate and growing foreign wealth. The reason why i falis
was already discussed. As to W’, consider that after the opening ofthe
domestic market there will be initially a capital outflow exactlymatch
ing the inflow, as a result of the exchange of securities explained
before, i.e., dF/dt dB*/dt. Thus the immediate variation in the
current account deficit (i.e., before taking into account the deficit’s
wealth effects) is given by
dQ/dt = (i
— i*)dB*/dt,
which shows that there will be an erosion as long as i > i’. Thus, when
the dornestic bond rnarket opens to foreign investment, we shift to the
right of the w une, to a point such as A: over time there will be a fali
in the domestic interest rate together with a rise in foreign wealth.
Assume the portfolio adjustment to the financial opening has
been completed, so that B* = gW. Then we will have









= Q = T
— i*m(2
— W) + igW, (6a)
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where now there is an additional portfolio effect of interest rate
variations via g. Ifinternational reserves are to remain constant, the
domestic interest rate has to adjust to produce a net capital surpius
equal to the current account deficit. The demand for domestic securi
ties can be specified, in the standard way, as
B=hQ+(g_h)W*, h’(i)>O
where h is the desired share of domestic bonds in domestic portfolios
as a function of the interest rate differential. In general, we can
assume that g — h < O, as a reflection ofhome bias in private portfolios
(see Obstfeld 1995). Ifdomestic authorities refrain from financing the
current account deficit, which would in fact require an exchange of
reserves for domestic bonds with the domestic private sector, B will
remain constant. Moreover, if we recail that Q = —dW/dt dW*/dt,
then time differentiation of(8), and solving for dildt yields,
dildt = Q(h — g)/[h’2 + (g’
— h’)W*],
which shows that, after the portfolio adjustment is over, the interest
rate rises in proportion to the current account deficit (given that the
country’s current account deficit is a extremely small fraction ofworld
wealth, both the portfolio shares and foreign wealth will change very
slowly).
A comparison of (6a) and (9) shows that the w and i unes are
identical after the portfolio adjustment is over, representing the
combinations of interest rate and foreign wealth that yield a zero
current account (see Figure 8). Thus the complete trajeçtory is as
follows: after the opening of the domestic bond market, the interest
rate starts falling, moving from A to B; once the portfolio adjustment
is over (point B in Figures 7 and 8), the movement is reversed and the
interest rate begins rising. 1 ’ Throughout the process, there is a home
current account deficit and domestic wealth is falling.
The interest rate follows a u-shaped path, which is independent
ofthe behavior ofexchange rate expectations. The pattern is aresult of
a change in the dynamics ofthe phase space, in particular in the way
11 In terms of Figure 5, the redistribution of world wealth keeps changing the shape of
the cumulative distribution (because of home bias), thus raising continuously the domestic
interest rate.
Foreign wealth
the interest rate behaves in relation to the i une. During portfolio
adjustment, there is an excess demand for home securities, which is
what makes it possible to finance a current account deficit — i.e., to
transfer domestic assets to the rest of the world — with a falling
interest rate. After the excess demand is removed, the only way to
continue the transfer is by offering a rising interest rate to foreign
investors. Left to itself, the economy would show ever increasing i and W* values; to avoid this unsustainable path, the real exchange rate
eventually has to depreciate and in that way shift the w une to the
economy’s current position. Note though that how much time passes
before the exchange rate adjustment takes place is important: the
longer the delay, the further northeast the economy’s stable position
will be, as a reflection of the accumulation of foreign debt (see Artis
and Taylor 1995).
The interest rate and wealth variations that take place during
portfolio adjustment and afterwards have implications for the evolu
tion of asset holdings. During the adjustment, the interest rate fali
results in a lower desired share ofdomestic securities at home (and an
equal rise in the share of foreign securities). Of course, this is what
makes possible the portfolio recomposition after the market is opened.
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But there is simultaneously a wealth effect from the current account
deficit: for any given interest rate, the fail in domestic wealth tends to
depress horne holdings ofboth domestic and foreign securities. Taking
the two effects into account, the implication is that during the adjust
ment home holdings of home securities will fail (due to lower wealth
and interest rate), whereas borne holdings offoreign securities will not
rise as rnuch as suggested by the interest rate effect.
After the adjustment, both the interest rate and foreign wealth
rise. The interest rate effect tends to raise the overail (home and
foreign) demand for home securities, and the opposite foi’ foreign
securities, whereas the wealth effect reduces the home demand for
both types of securities, and increases it abroad. As a result, foreign
portfolios will show risingholdings ofhome securities, induced by both
effects, which means that home holdings of home securities will have
to fali (since the overail supply of dornestic securities is constant).
Horne holdings of foreign securities will also fali, with both effects
acting in the same direction (that is, domestic residents will seli both
borne and foreign securities to finance their excess expenditure).
In surnrnary, the importance of this analysis for our present
purposes is its suggestionthat, besides the influence ofmacroeconomic
fundarnentais such as studied in section 2, the opening ofthe Mexican
bond rnarket to foreign investment in late 1990 was a reinforcingfactor
of the downward trend in the cete-tesobono interest rate differential
seen from late 1992 to early 1994. Clearly, a lag in portfolio adjustment
needs to be assurned for the story to make sense. In this regard, it is
significative that the net capital inflow into the peso bond market
jumped, according to balance ofpayrnents data, frorn only $3.4 billion
in 1991 (i.e., the year following the liberalization) to $8.3 billion in 1992
and $7.5 billion in 1993. Also supportive in relation to fhe implied
changes in asset holdings, is the estimate that, by the end of 1994,
about 70% of tesobonos and 50% of cetes were in foreign hands (see
Folkerts-Landau et al., 1996).
4. Summary
The level of exchange rate policy credibility in Mexico, as measured
by an adjusted cete-tesobono interest rate differential, varied widely
in the period 1991-1994. Most notably, the market moved from high
skepticisrn in late 1992, with excess expected depreciation peaking at
10% per year, to full credibility in the second half of 1993 and early
1994, when in fact the adjtisted differential turned negative. Following
a 14 point discrete jump in the first quarter of 1994 and a partial
reversal later on, excess expected depreciation stood at about 2.5%just
before the Decernber 1994 devaluation. These movements in policy
credibility appear to be significantly associated with changes in
macroeconomic fundamentals, such as the dornestic inflation rate and
the central bank’s international reserve position — positively —, and
output growth and the trade deficit — negatively —, and policy shocks
such as the ratification of NAFrA. In particular, the shift toward high
leveis of credibility in the course of 1993 and early 1994 can be
explained by a build-up ofgovernment disinflationary reputation, ever
increasing reserve holdings at the central bank, the stabilization
(although at a high level) of the trade deficit, and the NAFTA factor.
We argued that the stability ofthe interest differential in the final
months of 1994 was supported by a process of increasing indexation
of dornestic debt to the dollar, both indirectly (by raising the fiscal
cost ofa devaluation), and directly (by rernoving the group ofinvestors
with the highest depreciation expectations from the cete market). This
helps in explaining the puzzling observation of an apparent improve
rnent in expectations in the rnidst ofstrong political uncertainty. More
generally, we can conclude that the relatively low cete-tesobono inter
est rate differential registered before the devaluation was the combined
outcome of the notably high level of policy credibility already achieved
by the time of Colosio’s assassination, and the steady exchange rate
indexation of dornestic debt. Finally, we speculated that the opening of
the domestic bond market to foreign investment in December 1990,
which was followed with sorne lag by massive capital inflows, was also a
factor behind the reduction in the cete-tesobono differential.
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Price and Rate Regulations
for the Mexican Natural Gas
Industry: Comments on Policy
Decisions
Juan Rosellón*
Abstract: After the regulatory reform experienced in the Mexican gas sector, three areas with market power remained. Production is a legal
monopoly of Pemex. Transportation and distribution are natural monopo
lies. Distributor’s gas sales to (mainly residential) customers are poten tially monopolistie in case oflack ofcompetition from rnarketers or substi
tute fuels. This paper presents the theoretical concepts and international
lessons considered during the design of the price and rate regulations to limit these areas ofmarket power. Benchmarkingis used to control Pernex
gas prices, while a sophisticated revenue cap rnethodology is ernployed to
regulate transportation and distribution rates. MI of these rnechanisms
provide incentives for productive efficiency, take care of allocative efli
ciency, and minimize the cost of regulation. The paper also points out
lessons from the policy design process and sorne ofthe potential pitfalls of
regulations as well.
Resumen: Después de la reforma reguladora en el sector del gas mexicano
la producción es aún un monopolio legal. El transporte y la distribución son
monopolios naturales. Las ventas de gas de los distribuidores a los consu
midores (principalmente residenciales) son potencialmente monopolísticas
cuando no existe competencia de comercializadores o de combustibles
sustitutos. Este documento presenta conceptos teóricos y lecciones inter
nacionales considerados durante el diseño de la regulación de precios y tarifas. Para regular los precios del gas nacional se usa una referencia
internacional, mientras que para regular las tarifas de transporte y dis
tribución se emplea una metodología de ingreso máximo. Estos mecanis
mos promueven la eficiencia en la producción y en la asignación, y minimi zan los costos de la regulación. También se destacan las lecciones del
proceso de diseño de política así como algunos problemas potenciales de las
regulaciones.
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